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Abstract
Philosophers typically rely on intuitions when providing a semantics for
counterfactual conditionals. However, intuitions regarding counterfactual
conditionals are notoriously shaky. The aim of this paper is to provide a
principled account of the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. This
principled account is provided by what I dub the Royal Rule, a determin-
istic analogue of the Principal Principle relating chance and credence.
The Royal Rule says that an ideal doxastic agent’s initial grade of dis-
belief in a proposition A, given that the counterfactual distance in a given
context to the closest A-worlds equals n, and no further information that is
not admissible in this context, should equal n. Under the two assumptions
that the presuppositions of a given context are admissible in this context, and
that the theory of deterministic alethic or metaphysical modality is admissi-
ble in any context, it follows that the counterfactual distance distribution in a
given context has the structure of a ranking function. The basic conditional
logic V is shown to be sound and complete with respect to the resulting
rank-theoretic semantics of counterfactuals.
2
1 Introduction
Philosophers of language and philosophical logicians typically rely on intuitions
when providing a semantics for counterfactual conditionals. However, intuitions
regarding counterfactual conditionals are notoriously shaky.
As an example consider the debate between Stalnaker and Lewis about the va-
lidity of the so-called law of conditional excluded middle, (A C)∨(A ¬C).
According to Stalnaker (1968) this principle is logically valid. Lewis (1973: 77ff)
disagrees and presents the following counterexample:
C It is not the case that if Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would be
Italian; and it is not the case that if Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet
would not be Italian; nevertheless, if Bizet and Verdi were compatriots,
Bizet either would or would not be Italian.
Stalnaker (1981: 91ff), according to whom the example originates with Quine
(1950), defends an analysis which says that both
C1 If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would have been Italian.
C2 If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Verdi would have been French.
“are indeterminate – neither true nor false. It seems to me that the latter conclusion
is clearly the more natural one. I think most speakers would be as hesitant to deny
as to affirm either of the conditionals, and it seems as clear that one cannot deny
them both as it is that one cannot affirm them both. Lewis seems to agree that
unreflective linguistic intuition favors this conclusion.” (Stalnaker 1981: 92)
The reason for Stalnaker’s last claim is that Lewis (1973: 80) says: “I want to
say [C], and think it probably true [...]. But offhand, I must admit, it does sound
like a contradiction. Stalnaker’s theory does, and mine does not, respect the opin-
ion of any ordinary language speaker who cares to insist that it is a contradiction.”
As Stalnaker (1981: 92) points out, “it would be arbitrary to require a choice
of one of [C1 and C2] over the other, but [...] this is not at issue. What is at issue
is what conclusion about the truth values of the counterfactuals should be drawn
from the fact that such a choice would be arbitrary.”
The conclusion drawn by Lewis is that both C1 and C2 are false, and hence
that conditional excluded middle is not logically valid. The conclusion drawn by
Stalnaker is that both C1 and C2 are indeterminate, and that conditional excluded
middle is logically valid. End of dicussion.
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An example from the more recent literature is the discussion between Gillies
and Moss about where to draw the line between the semantics and the pragmatics
of counterfactuals. Here is the relevant background. Lewis (1973: 10), referring to
Sobel (1970), uses so-called Sobel sequences to argue against the analysis of the
counterfactual conditional as a strict conditional. Sobel sequences are examples
such as:
S1 If Sophia had a good offer from MIT, she would move to the East Coast.
S2 If Sophia had a good offer from MIT and if she had an even better offer
from Caltech, she would not move to the East Coast.
Lewis assumes that counterfactuals such as these can be jointly true. This is not
so if the counterfactual conditional is a strict, or necessarily true, material con-
ditional. Lewis concludes that the counterfactual conditional is a variably strict
conditional, a strict conditional whose strictness varies with the antecedent.
Gillies (2007) considers reverse Sobel sequences:
S2 If Sophia had a good offer from MIT and if she had an even better offer
from Caltech, she would not move to the East Coast.
S1 If Sophia had a good offer from MIT, she would move to the East Coast.
For Gillies (2007: 332) “this sounds for all the world like a contradiction.” He
then goes on to argue that the counterfactual conditional is a strict conditional, but
one whose truth values interact with context in such a way that the order in which
two counterfactual conditionals are asserted matters.
Moss (2012) defends Lewis’ analysis of the counterfactual conditional as a
variably strict conditional. She admits that reverse Sobel sequences are “generally
infelicitous”, though contrary to Gillies (2007) she does not consider them to be
inconsistent. Moss first considers sentences other than counterfactual conditionals
and notes that the order in which they are uttered matters:
M1 My car is around the corner.
M2 But cars get stolen in NYC all the time.
For her this conversation is felicitous, while the reversed one is not:
M2’ Cars get stolen in NYC all the time.
M1’ But my car is around the corner.
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According to her “[o]ur intuitions [...] point towards a general principle governing
assertability [... which ...] tells us that if a speaker cannot rule out a possibility
made salient by some utterance, then it is irresponsible of her to assert a proposi-
tion incompatible with this possibility.” (Moss 2012: 568)
As before, “[w]hat is at issue is what conclusions about the truth values of
the counterfactuals should be drawn” from the fact that reverse Sobel sequences
are not felicitous. The conclusion drawn by Gillies is that the truth values of
counterfactuals depend on the order in which they are uttered. The conclusion
drawn by Moss is that the assertability conditions, but not the truth values, of
counterfactuals depend on the order in which they are uttered. End of discussion.
Both examples1 illustrate a common pattern. Two philosophers share a (lin-
guistic) intuition – the arbitrariness of choosing between C1 and C2; the infelicity
of reverse Sobel sequences – but disagree on the details of, or the best explanation
for, this (linguistic) intuition. Where Lewis intuits falsity in addition to arbitrari-
ness, or explains arbitrariness by falsity, Stalnaker intuits vagueness in addition
to arbitrariness, or explains arbitrariness by vagueness. Where Gillies intuits in-
consistency in addition to infelicity, or explains infelicity by inconsistency, Moss
intuits unassertability in addition to infelicity, or explains infelicity by unasserta-
bility.
This is bad news. Our intuitions are supposed to be the evidence deciding
between rival philosophical theories. If we cannot agree on what the data are, on
whose intuitions to rely on, we cannot agree on which theory to believe. Nor can
we agree on which theory to believe, if we cannot agree on which explanation is
best. This is bad news, indeed. Besides discussions in the philosophy of language
and in philosophical logic this affects other discussions involving counterfactuals:
in epistemology kowledge is analyzed in terms of counterfactuals (Nozick 1981),
in metaphysics causation is analyzed in terms of counterfactuals (Collins & Hall &
Paul 2004), and in the philosophy of science dispositions are analyzed in terms of
counterfactuals (Mumford 1998). Outside philosophy psychologists discuss regret
and responsibility in counterfactual terms (Connolly & Ordón˜atez & Coughlan
1997). This list can be continued.
One reaction might be to go experimental (Knobe & Nichols 2008) and to see
which intuitions, or subjective evaluations of the quality of explanations, are more
widespread. On my view this would not help much, because truth is not a matter
1Another example is provided by the discussion between Lewis and Stalnaker versus Kratzer
and Pollock about the semantic principle of Comparability according to which, roughly, any two
worlds can be compared with respect to their similarity to the actual world. Cf. Lewis (1981: sct.
5) and references therein.
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of democracy.2 What we need, or at least what we should aim at, is a principled
account of the semantics of counterfactuals.
I call an account principled if it is derived from a valid normative principle.
A normative principle says that one ought to do something given that one has
a certain goal. For instance, a normative principle might say that one should
hold consistent beliefs given that one has the goal of holding only true beliefs.
A normative principle is valid only if obeying the norm, doing what it says one
should do, is a means to attaining the goal. The normative principle that one
ought to hold consistent beliefs given that one has the goal of holding only true
beliefs is valid only if holding consistent beliefs is a means to attaining the end of
holding only true beliefs. One justifies a normative principle by establishing that
obeying the norm is a means to attaining the goal. We may be able to justify the
normative principle that one should hold consistent beliefs given that one has the
goal of holding only true beliefs by proving that the consistency of one’s beliefs
is necessary for their joint truth. Of course, if one does not aim at true beliefs, that
will not cut any ice. But that is besides the point. It is mistaking a hypothetical
for a categorical imperative.
A principled account opens up the possibility of a justification that is not, or
not exclusively, based on intuitions, or subjective evaluations of the quality of
explanations, which vary across subjects and within subjects across contexts and
over time. The reason is that a normative principle is justified by establishing that
obeying the norm in question is a means to attaining the goal at issue. Whether
obeying a norm is a means to attaining a goal is an objective matter of fact and
not dependent on anyone’s intuitions or subjective evaluations of the quality of
explanations. What may not be an objective matter of fact is which cognitive
goals we have or should have, or which cognitive goals an ideal doxastic agent
has or should have.
Causal relevance and logical entailment are the prototypes of means-end re-
lationships in science and philosophy. As an example consider classical logic.
Interpreted as a set of norms for making inferences classical logic is justified rela-
tive to the goal of truth preservation in all logically possible worlds. The reason is
that one’s inferences attain the cognitive goal of truth preservation in all logically
possible worlds if and only if they obey the norms of classical logic. The episte-
mological significance of the soundness of classical logic lies in establishing the
2I do not want to say that experimental philosophers hold that truth is a matter of democracy.
If anyone is aware of the unreliability of intuitions, they are. What I want to say is that knowledge
of how intuitions are distributed across various populations will not settle the philosophical issue
at hand.
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if-direction of this means-end relationship. The epistemological significance of
the completeness of classical logic lies in establishing its only-if-direction. Fur-
ther examples include non-monotonic logic which, again interpreted as a set of
norms for making inferences, is justified relative to the different cognitive goal
of truth preservation in all normal among the logically possible worlds (Kraus &
Lehmann & Magidor 1990) and the probability calculus which, interpreted as a
set of norms for organizing one’s credences at a given moment in time, is justi-
fied relative to the cognitive goal of accuracy minimization (Joyce 1998; 2009).
One important role played by logical and mathematical reasoning in philosophy,
and by causal and statistical reasoning in science, is to establish these means-end
relationships.
Let us return to counterfactual conditionals, or counterfactuals for short. Be-
sides possible worlds their truth values depend on something else: selection func-
tions in case of Stalnaker (1968) and spheres of similarity in case of Lewis (1973).
I call this additional element counterfactual distance. Counterfactual distance fig-
ures as a primitive on my account. This does not mean it is void of content.
Similar to Lewis’ (1979: 472) “system of weights or priorities” we can say more
about it when we study its relation to causality (Huber 2013), and we can even
empirically confirm it (Huber ms). (For more on this see section 4.) Moreover,
counterfactual distance can be put in relation to belief, just as objective chance can
be put in relation to subjective credence. The central normative principle fixing
the semantics of counterfactuals will do just that.
In this paper I am content with pointing out that a principled account in the
sense explained is possible, and that it opens up the possibility for a justification
of the semantics of counterfactuals that is not, or not exclusively, based on in-
tuitions or subjective evaluations of the quality of explanations. The completion
of this justification has to be left to another paper. More precisely, I will present
two normative principles plus two assumptions about “admissibility” that together
entail that the semantics of counterfactuals has a certain structure. I will present
a means-end justification for the second normative principle according to which
gradings of disbelief should obey the ranking calculus. The first normative princi-
ple is a deterministic analogue of Lewis’ (1980) Principal Principle that is based
on Spohn’s (1988) theory of ranking functions. I dub it the Royal Rule.
The Royal Rule says that an ideal doxastic agent’s prior subjective strength
of disbelief in a proposition A, given that the counterfactual distance in a given
context to the closest A-worlds equals n, and no further information that is not
admissible in this context, should equal n. Contexts are represented as, roughly,
functions from worlds to sets of worlds. Assume first that the presuppositions in
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a given context are admissible in this context. Assume next that the theory of
deterministic alethic or metaphysical modality is admissible in any context. Then
it follows that the counterfactual distance distribution in a given context equals
an ideal doxastic agent’s prior subjective grading of disbelief conditional on the
theory of deterministic alethic or metaphysical modality and the presuppositions
in this context. Call this the first conclusion.
In Huber (2007) I argue for the thesis that all and only ranking functions are
reasonable gradings of disbelief. The argument for this thesis is based on a the-
orem to the effect that an ideal doxastic agent’s belief set is and will always be
consistent and deductively closed just in case her gradings of disbelief obey the
ranking calculus and she updates according to the update rules of ranking theory.
Since a conditional ranking function is a ranking function the first conclusion im-
plies that deterministic alethic or metaphysical modalities have the structure of
ranking functions. Call this the second conclusion.
If we now substitute Spohn’s ranking functions for Stalnaker’s selection func-
tions or Lewis’ systems of spheres we get a rank-theoretic semantics of counter-
factuals with respect to which the basic conditional logic V is sound and complete.
I thus side with Lewis against Stalnaker as far as conditional excluded middle is
concerned, and with Moss against Gillies with regard to the question where to
draw the line between the semantics and the pragmatics of counterfactuals.3
In three and a half companion papers I have explained how these rank-theoretic
counterfactuals relate to causation (Huber 2011), how they fix a problem besetting
Lewis’ (1979) story about the relation between laws, counterfactuals, and particu-
lar facts that arises from to Arrow’s impossibility result from social choice theory
(Kroedel & Huber 2013), how they go beyond structural equations (Huber 2013),
and how they can be empirically confirmed (Huber ms). In another companion
paper I still have to provide a means-end justification of the Royal Rule (includ-
ing the two assumptions about admissibility) with respect to a pertinent cognitive
goal. This pertinent cognitive goal will be to stably hold true beliefs.4
3I side with Lewis and Stalnaker against Kratzer and Pollock regarding Comparability.
4Here is the idea. Once the ideal doxastic agent is certain of the relevant counterfactuals, the
Royal Rule requires her to hold onto her conditional beliefs when she receives new, but admissi-
ble information. Given the relevant counterfactuals no additional information that is admissible
may affect her conditional beliefs. Given the relevant counterfactuals the ideal doxastic agent’s
conditional beliefs are stable across all admissible information. Stable true beliefs are better than
mere true beliefs in a way that is similar to how safety (Williamson 2000) makes knowledge better
than mere true belief. My plan is to show that obeying the Royal Rule is a means to attaining the
cognitive goal of stably holding true beliefs. This will justify the Royal Rule, and thereby also the
derived semantics for counterfactuals, to the extent that one desires this cognitive goal.
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Such a means-end justification is most important, for otherwise the Royal Rule
would be on its own, and the principled account would merely relocate rather than
reduce reliance on intuitions or subjective evaluations of the quality of explana-
tions.
Here is the plan for the rest of this paper. In the next section I will give an
unorthodox formulation of Lewis’ Principal Principle that does not rely on Lewis’
Humean supervenience assumption with respect to chances. Then I will introduce
ranking functions. These sections pave the way for a formulation of the Royal
Rule that is sensitive to the supervenience of deterministic alethic or metaphysical
modalities on non-modal matters of particular fact. The latter supervenience on
the metaphysical side will turn out to correspond to the iterability of the coun-
terfactual conditional operator on the logical side. After deducing the first and
second conclusion from above I will conclude by discussing some consequences.
In an appendix I will prove that the basic conditional logic V is sound and com-
plete with respect to the rank-theoretic semantics of counterfactuals.
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2 The Principal Principle Without Humean Super-
venience
In his (1980) Lewis presents the following normative principle:
Principal Principle 1 Let Pr be an ideal doxastic agent’s initial credence func-
tion, let t be a point of time, let x be a real number in the unit interval, let
cht (A) = x be the proposition that the objective chance at time t that A holds
equals x, and let Et be a proposition that is admissible at t. Then
Pr (A | cht (A) = x ∩ Et) = x.
The Principal Principle for probabilities says that an ideal doxastic agent’s initial,
or a priori, credence in a proposition A, given that the objective chance of A at
time t equals x, and no further information that is not admissible at t, should equal
x.
Lewis argues that the complete history of world w up to time t, Hwt, is admis-
sible at t as well as that w’s theory of indeterministic alethic modality, w’s theory
of chance, Tw, is admissible at any time. This allows him to “reformulate” the
Principal Principle as follows:
Principal Principle 2 Let Pr be an ideal doxastic agent’s initial credence func-
tion. Then for any point of time t, world w, and proposition A
chwt (A) = Pr (A | Hwt ∩ Tw) .
Here chwt is the chance distribution of world w at time t, and A is a proposition
in the domain of chwt. The thesis that an ideal doxastic agent’s credence function
should obey the probability calculus, and the theorem that conditional probability
measures are probability measures, then allow Lewis to conclude that objective
chances obey the probability calculus.
A mathematical oddity in this argument is that Lewis is working with non-
standard probabilities to ensure that all propositions chwt (A) = x receive non-
zero probability in the sense of Pr (Bernstein & Wattenberg 1969). Otherwise the
conditional probabilities Pr (A|cht (A) = x ∩ Et) may not be defined. In order to
avoid this problem, Spohn (2010) considers propositions of the form: cht (A) ∈
(a, b), where a < b. Another option may be to refer to Popper-measures instead of
classical probabilities (Popper 1955, Rényi 1955, Spohn 1986, Stalnaker 1970).
Such manoeuvres will not be necessary in our case.
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A philosophical oddity in this argument arises in connection with Lewis’ as-
sumption that chances supervene on local matters of particular fact (Lewis 1986).
In order to get clear about what this assumption amounts to let W be the set of
all factual worlds, where a factual world w completely specifies all non-modal
matters of fact, all local matters of particular fact. Worlds completely specifying
both all non-modal matters of fact as well as all modal matters of “fact” are called
universes. The reason for this slightly deviating terminology is that it allows us
to get clear about the implications of Lewis’ Humean supervenience assumption
with respect to chances for the Principal Principle. For the time being the only
modalities considered will be indeterministic alethic modalities or chances.
A universe u is a pair (wu, chu) consisting of a purely factual component wu
from the set of factual worlds W and a purely (indeterministic alethic) modal
component chu from the set of potential chance measures CH defined on some
field or algebra over W, AW. The set of all universes U is a (not necessarily
proper) subset of the Cartesian product W×CH of the set of factual worlds W and
the set of potential chance measures CH onAW. LetAU be a field or an algebra
of propositions over U. The ideal doxastic agent’s initial credence function Pr is
defined onAU and so assigns credences Pr (B) to propositions B fromAU.
Lewis’ Humean supervenience assumption with respect to chance implies the
following claim. For every5 factual world w in W there is exactly one potential
chance measure chw in CH such that (w, chw) is in U. Therefore, for any two
universes u = (wu, chu) and u′ = (wu′ , chu′) from U: if wu = wu′ , then chu = chu′ ,
and hence u = u′. This means that a potentially modal claim such as cht(A) = x
amounts to a purely factual claim, and, more generally, that the algebra of poten-
tially modal propositionsAU reduces to the algebra of purely factual propositions
AW. Please note that it does not make sense to speak of the chance distribution of
a factual world w at a certain time t, chwt, or a factual world’s theory of chance,
Tw, if the chances do not supervene on the totalities of non-modal, local matters
of particular fact. Without Humean supervenience with respect to chance we have
to speak of the chance distribution of universe u = (wu, chu) at time t, chut, and of
a universe’s theory of chance, Tu.
Humean supervenience with respect to chance allows Lewis to iterate chances
so that it makes sense to speak of the chance at an earlier time t0 of the chance
at a later time t1 that some factual proposition is true, cht0
(
cht1 (A) = y
)
= x.
5Here I am following Stalnaker (1996: §4) who suggests that Lewis’ Humean supervenience
assumption should not be viewed as a contingent thesis. If one did, one would have to restrict the
scope of the universal quantifier to some proper subset of W (including the actual factual world).
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This in turn leads to the problem of undermining futures (Hall 1994, Lewis 1994,
Thau 1994; for criticism see Hoefer 1997), something to be shied away from. In
a nutshell, the problem is that the Principal Principle implies that there are no
propositions F with the following properties: the conjunction of F and the actual
history up to a certain time t, Hwt ∩ F = {v}, yields t-chances different from what
they actually are, chvt , chwt or Hwt ∩ F ∩ Tw = ∅, even though F has some
non-zero t-chance in w of coming about, chwt (F) > 0. For a recent discussion see
Briggs (2009).
While certainly attractive, I follow Spohn (2010) in rejecting Humean super-
venience with respect to chance. I will also reject Humean supervenience with
respect to deterministic alethic modality. The metaphysical picture I have allows
there to be several possible universes that agree on the non-modal facts but dis-
agree on the modalities. Factual claims say what is or is not the case. Modal
claims, whether alethically (metaphysically) modal or doxastically (epistemically)
modal, do not say what is the case. They say how something else is the case (for
someone). They essentially rely on something else, and I take that something else
to be factual – at least eventually, if modalities can be iterated or mixed as in the
claim that I believe that the plate would be likely to break if it were dropped.
Consequently a possible universe is represented as a triple (w, ch, r) of a non-
modal, factual component w, an indeterministic alethic modal component ch, and
a deterministic alethic modal component r. The set of all possible universes
Ω is represented as a (not necessarily proper) subset of the Cartesian product
W × CH × R of the set of factual worlds W, the set of potential indeterministic
alethic modalities or chance measures CH, and the set of potential deterministic
alethic modalities or counterfactual distances R. Potential chances ch are defined
on an algebraAW of purely factual propositions A ⊆W. Potential counterfactual
distances r are defined on an algebra AU of propositions B ⊆ U ⊆ W × CH.
Doxastic modalities such as credences and beliefs are defined on an algebra AΩ
of propositions X ⊆ Ω ⊆W × CH × R.
If chances do not supervene on facts the chance that a given uranium atom
decays within a certain interval can be different in two possible universes, even
though those two universes agree on all matters of particular fact, including the
(limiting) relative frequencies of decay.
If counterfactual distances do not supervene on facts it may be true in one
universe u that Bizet would be Italian if Bizet and Verdi were compatriots. It
may be true in another universe u′ that Verdi would be French if Bizet and Verdi
were compatriots. And this may be so, even though these two universes u and
u′ agree on all non-modal matters of fact such as whether Bizet is French and
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whether Verdi is Italian and when they were born where. The difference between
u = (wu, chu, ru) and u′ = (wu′ , chu′ , ru′) may only concern the modal components
ru and ru′: among the worlds where Bizet and Verdi are compatriots, ru may rank
those closer to wu = wu′ where Bizet is Italian, while ru′ may rank those closer
to wu′ = wu where Verdi is French. However, this difference in counterfactual
distance will not be reflected in any difference between wu and wu′ . Ann and
Bob inhabit the same actual world w, but the way Ann conceives of alternative
worlds may be different from the way Bob conceives of alternative worlds. What
are important differences and far-fetched alternatives for Ann, may be differences
and distances Bob does not even notice. The counterfactuals that are true in Ann’s
universe (w, ch, rA) will be different from the counterfactuals that are true in Bob’s
universe (w, ch, rB). Only one of Ann and Bob can be right about the actual differ-
ences and distances of other worlds from w, but both their views may be possible,
and I can suspend judgment about, or distribute my mass of credence equally
among, those two possible views or universes.
We can, of course, also combine deterministic and indeterministic alethic
modalities. It may be true in one universe that the plate would be likely to break,
if it were dropped, but false in another one, even though the plate is dropped
and breaks in both of these two universes, and they also agree on all other local
matters of particular fact. And it may be necessarily true in one universe, and
possibly false in another, that the chance of past events is zero, even though these
two universes agree on all local matters of particular fact.
On Lewis’ view chance or indeterministic alethic modality is a primitive. All
we know about it is encapsulated in the Principal Principle. Traditional meta-
physics has paid more attention to deterministic alethic modalities. Kripke (1959)
and others clarified the qualitative notions of necessity and possibility, and then
Stalnaker (1968) pointed out that they are intimately related to counterfactuals.
Similarly, traditional epistemology has focused on the qualitative notion of be-
lief rather than the quantitative notion of credence. Hintikka (1961) clarified the
logic of unconditional belief, and Alchourrón & Gärdenfors & Makinson (1985)
started to realize that there is more to the doxastic state than can be expressed by
unconditional beliefs. However, as observed by Spohn (1988), AGM belief revi-
sion theory is a theory of belief revision by name only, and Hild & Spohn (2008)
show why one has to go all the way from AGM’s entrenchment orderings that
characterize one-step revisions to Spohn’s ranking functions, which characterize
indefinitely iterable revisions.
The thesis I submit is that deterministic alethic modality constrains qualita-
tive belief in much the same way that chance constrains credence. However, this
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is something that cannot even be adequately formulated within the confines of
Hintikka-style epistemic logic or AGM belief revision theory. The reason is that
both accounts lack a notion of conditional belief. In contrast to this ranking func-
tions are essentially conditional (and essentially numerical).
Before turning to ranking functions let me address a worry about the rejection
of Humean supervenience with respect to deterministic alethic modalities. Is it not
an utter mystery how we could possibly gain knowledge of non-trivial determinis-
tic alethic modalities if the latter do not supervene on the facts? And consequently,
is it not utterly mysterious how we can gain non-trivial philosophical knowledge?
The worry arises because all our evidence is restricted to facts. This is not the
place to explain how such knowledge is possible, but rather to point out that we
do not find a similar mystery worrisome.
First, the mystery would remain even if Humean supervenience with respect to
deterministic alethic modalities were to hold. For while it is true that all our evi-
dence is restricted to facts, it is also true that all our evidence is restricted to a finite
initial segment of the facts. In fact, all our evidence is at best a very incomplete
finite initial segment of the facts. Second, consider the widespread view of scien-
tific realism which holds that science aims at truth rather than mere empirical or
observational adequacy. This view is interesting because it is uncontroversial that
there are some (theoretical) facts that are in principle unobservable in the widest
possible sense, and so will never be part of anyone’s evidence. (This claim is
agreed upon, even though some philosophers think there is no clearcut distinction
between theory and observation.) Scientific realism may be challenged because
it seems mysterious how we could gain knowledge of the unobservable if all our
evidence is restricted to the observable. However, no anti-realist would claim that
the unobservable supervened on the observable because otherwise it was unclear
how we could gain knowledge of the unobservable. Similarly, the epistemologi-
cal mystery of the possibility of philosophical and other modal knowledge should
not be taken to support the metaphysical thesis that the modalities in question
supervene on non-modal facts.
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3 Ranking Functions
Ranking functions have been introduced by Spohn (1988) to represent qualitative
conditional belief. They are discussed at booklength in Spohn (2012). The theory
is numerical in the sense that ranking functions assign numbers to propositions,
but these numbers are really only needed for the definition of conditional ranking
functions representing conditional beliefs. Once these are defined everything can
be read in purely qualitative, though conditional terms.
Here is the definition. Consider a space of possibilities P and an algebra of
propositionsAP over P. A function % : AP → N ∪ {∞} is a finitely / countably /
completely minimitive ranking function onAP just in case for all finite / countable
/ arbitrary sets of propositions B ⊆ AP:
% (P) = 0 (1)







% (B) : B ∈ B} (3)
For a non-empty or consistent proposition A , ∅ fromAP the conditional ranking
function % (· | A) : AP \ {∅} → N ∪ {∞} based on the unconditional ranking
function % (·) : AP →N ∪ {∞} is defined as
% (· | A) =
{
% (· ∩ A) − % (A) , if % (A) < ∞,
0, if % (A) = ∞.
Stipulating % (∅ | A) = ∞ ensures that every conditional ranking function is a
ranking function on AP. A ranking function % is regular if and only if % (A) <
% (∅) for all non-empty or consistent propositionsA fromAP. (As a terminological
aside: a set of subsets of P, AP ⊆ ℘ (P), is an algebra over P if and only if for
all A,B from AP: ∅ ∈ A, A ∈ A, and A ∪ B ∈ A. An algebra AP over P is a
σ- / complete algebra over P if and only if for all countable / arbitrary B ⊆ AP:⋃B ∈ AP.)
Ranks are interpreted doxastically as grades of disbelief. A proposition A is
disbelieved just in case it is assigned a positive rank A, % (A) > 0. A proposition




> 0. A proposition A
is disbelieved conditional on a proposition C just in case A is assigned a positive
rank conditional on C, % (A | C) > 0. A proposition A is believed conditional on





> 0. It takes getting used to read positive numbers in this “negative”
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way, but mathematically this is the simplest formulation and so I will stick to it.
Note that it follows from the definition of conditional ranks that an ideal doxastic
agent should not disbelieve a proposition conditional on itself, % (A | A) = 0.
In doxastic terms the first axiom says that an ideal doxastic agent should not
disbelieve the tautological proposition W. The second axiom says that she should
disbelieve the empty or contradictory proposition ∅ with maximal strength ∞.
Given the definition of conditional ranks, the second axiom can be read in purely
qualitative, though conditional terms: it says that she should disbelieve the empty
or contradictory proposition conditional on any proposition (with a finite rank). It
follows that one should believe the tautological proposition with maximal strength
or conditional on any proposition (with a finite rank).
Part of what the third axiom says is that an ideal doxastic agent should disbe-
lieve a disjunction
⋃B just in case she disbelieves all its disjuncts B ∈ B. Given
the definition of conditional ranks, the third axiom extends this requirement to
conditional beliefs. As just noted we may assume that the ideal doxastic agent
should not disbelieve a proposition conditional on itself. Given this the third ax-
iom says – in purely qualitative, though conditional terms – the following: she
should conditionally disbelieve a disjunction
⋃B just in case she conditionally
disbelieves all its disjuncts B ∈ B.
Doxastically interpreted axioms (1)-(3) are synchronic norms for organizing
an ideal doxastic agent’s conditional beliefs at a given moment in time. They
are supplemented by diachronic norms for updating her beliefs over time if new
information of various formats is received. The first update rule is defined for the
case where the new information comes in form a certainty and mirrors the update
rule of strict conditionalization from probability theory.
Update Rule 1 (Plain Conditionalization, Spohn 1988) If % (·) : AP → N ∪
{∞} is the ideal doxastic agent’s ranking function at time t, and between t and t′
she becomes certain of E ∈ AP and no logically stronger proposition (in the sense
that E is the logically strongest proposition whose negation she assigns∞ as new
rank at t′), then her ranking function at time t′ should be %E (·) : AP →N∪ {∞},
%E (·) = % (· | E), where for all non-empty or consistent B inAP,
%E (B) = % (B ∩ E) − % (E) and % (∅ | E) = ∞.
and, for n ∈N,∞− n = ∞ and∞−∞ = 0.
The second update rule is defined for the case where the new information comes
in form of new ranks for the elements of a partition and mirrors the update rule of
Jeffrey conditionalization from probability theory (Jeffrey 1983).
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Update Rule 2 (Spohn Conditionalization, Spohn 1988) If % (·) : AP → N ∪
{∞} is the ideal doxastic agent’s ranking function at time t, and between t and
t′ her ranks on the evidential partition {Ei ∈ AP : i ∈ I} directly change to ni ∈
N ∪ {∞} with min {ni : i ∈ I} = 0 (ni = ∞ for Ei = ∅ and ni = 0 for Ei = P),
and her finite ranks do not directly change on any finer partition, then her ranking
function at time t′ should be %Ei→ni (·) : AP →N ∪ {∞},
%Ei→ni (·) = min i∈I
{
% (· | Ei) + ni} .
The third update rule is defined for the case where the new information reports the
differences between the old and the new ranks for the elements of a partition and
mirrors the update rule of Field conditionalization from probability theory (Field
1978).
Update Rule 3 (Shenoy Conditionalization, Shenoy 1991) If % (·) : AP →N∪
{∞} is the ideal doxastic agent’s ranking function at time t, and between t and t′
her ranks on the evidential partition {Ei ∈ AP : i ∈ I} directly change by zi ∈ N,
where min {zi : i ∈ I} = 0, and her finite ranks do not directly change on any finer
partition, then her ranking function at time t′ should be %Ei↑zi (·) : AP →N∪{∞},
%Ei↑zi (·) = min i∈I
{
% (· ∩ Ei) + zi −m} , m = min i∈I {zi + % (Ei)} .
Spohn conditionalizing the evidential propositions E and E to 0 and n, respec-
tively, keeps the relative positions of all possible worlds in E and all possible
worlds in E fixed. It impoves the rank of E to 0 and changes the rank of E to
n. Shenoy conditionalizing E and E by 0 and n, respectively, improves the pos-
sibilities within E by n, as compared to the possibilities in E. m merely is a
normalization parameter that ensures that at least one possible world is assigned
rank zero so that the result is a ranking function.
In both cases the new information consists of a (partition of) proposition(s)
together with a (list of) number(s). This reflects the fact that the quality of new
information varies with the reliability of its source: it makes a difference if the
weather forecast predicts that it will rain, if a friend the ideal doxastic agent trusts
tells her so, or if she sees herself that it is raining. In each case the proposition
she learns is that it is raining, but the effect of the new information on her old
beliefs may be a different one in each case. The difference in the reliability of the
sources of the new information is reflected in the number(s) accompanying the
proposition(s). The effect the new information has on her old beliefs depends on
those numbers.
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Why should an ideal doxastic agent organize her conditional beliefs at a given
moment in time according to axioms (1-3)? Why should an ideal doxastic agent
update her beliefs over time according to update rules (1-3) if she receives evi-
dence of the appropriate format? To answer these questions we need a little bit of
terminology.
An ideal doxastic agent’s degree of entrenchment for a proposition A is de-
fined as the number of independent and minimally positively reliable information
sources sayingA that it takes for her to give up her disbelief in A. Independent and
minimally positively reliable information sources for a proposition are idealized
entities that are used to define an ideal doxastic agent’s degrees of entrenchment.
Information sources as we know them usually are neither independent nor mini-
mally positively reliable.
The ideal doxastic agent’s grades of disbelief, her ranks, are theoretical enti-
ties. Their relation to her idealized, but otherwise observable degrees of entrench-
ment is a delicate one: minimally degrees of entrenchment are used to measure
grades of disbelief; maximally the latter can be defined in terms of the former.6
Let % be the ideal doxastic agent’s entrenchment function, i.e. the function that
summarizes her degrees of entrenchment for all the propositions under considera-
tion. Then her belief set B% is defined as the set of propositions whose negations
have a positive degree of entrenchment:
B% =
{






An ideal doxatic agent’s belief set B% ⊆ AP is consistent in the finite / count-
able / complete sense if and only if for every finite / countable / arbitrary set of
propositions B ⊆ B%: ⋂B , ∅.
An ideal doxastic agent’s belief setB ⊆ AP is deductively closed in the finite /
countable / complete sense if and only if for every finite / countable / arbitrary set
of propositions B ⊆ B% and all propositions A ∈ AP: if ⋂B ⊆ A, then A ∈ B%.
Now we can answer the question why an ideal doxastic agent agent should
organize her conditional beliefs at a given moment in time according to axioms
(1-3), and why she should update her beliefs over time according to update rules
(1-3) if she receives evidence of the appropriate format. She should do so, because
6The situation is somewhat similar in Bayesianism, where betting ratios or fair betting ratios
minimally are used to measure degrees of belief, and maximally are used to define them (Eriksson
& Hájek 2007). Whatever the exact relation between (fair) betting ratios and degrees of belief, the
former are the central notion in the best known argument in favor of Bayesianism, the Dutch Book
Argument.
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Theorem 1 An ideal doxastic agent’s belief set B% based on her entrenchment
function % is and will always be consistent and deductively closed in the finite /
countable / complete sense, possibly conditional on some element of the evidential
partition, if and only if % is a finitely / countably / completely minimitive ranking
function and, depending on the format of the evidence, the ideal doxastic agent
updates according to update rule 1, 2, or 3.
For proof and discussion the reader is referred to Huber (2007).
As indicated in the introduction, this theorem can be used to establish the the-
sis that an ideal doxastic agent’s beliefs should obey the synchronic and diachronic
rules of the ranking calculus. It can be used to provide a means-ends justification
for this thesis in the spirit of epistemic consequentialism (Percival 2002, Stalnaker
2002). The idea is that obeying the normative constraints of the ranking calculus is
a (necessary and sufficient) means to attaining the end of being “eternally consis-
tent and deductively closed.” The latter end in turn is a (necessary, but insufficient)
means to attaining the end of always having only true beliefs, and as many as pos-
sible thereof. Brössel & Eder & Huber (2013) discuss the importance of this result
as well as its Bayesian role-model, Joyce’s (1998; 2009) “non-pragmatic vindica-
tion of probabilism”, for considering epistemic rationality a form of instrumental
rationality and for means-ends epistemology in general.
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4 The Royal Rule
There is one more thing to note before we can state how deterministic alethic
modality constrains qualitative belief. While chances develop over time, counter-
factual distances vary across contexts. In the literature (Stalnaker 1999: ch. 1,
Gillies 2009) contexts are represented as relations between (centered) worlds or
as functions from (centered) worlds to sets of (centered) worlds. Since I have a
slightly more complicated picture I represent contexts as functions from universes
to sets of factual worlds. This means that what can be presupposed is restricted to
the realm of the non-modal.
Let a context be a function from universes to sets of factual worlds, c : Ω →
℘ (W) × {R}, where Ω ⊆ W × R is the set of all possible universes u = (wu, ru).
(Chances are ignored in order to avoid unnecessary complications.) c is alethically
respectable just in case for all u in Ω: u ∈ c (u). In contrast to Gillies (2009),
Stalnaker (1998) argues against this assumption as a definitional constraint on all
contexts. I agree: not every context is alethically respectable. However, those
contexts in which an ideal doxastic agent aims at the truth, and in which the Royal
Rule is supposed to hold, are. Stalnaker (1998) merely requires all contexts c to
be deontically respectable in the sense that for all u in Ω: c (u) , ∅. Both Gillies
(2009) and Stalnaker (1998) assume further that all contexts c are doxastically
respectable in the sense that for all u and u′ in Ω: c (u) ⊆ c (u′) if u′ ∈ c (u).7 I do
not make this assumption.
Now we can finally state the
Royal Rule 1 Let Ra : AΩ → N ∪ {∞} be an ideal doxastic agent’s initial
grading of disbelief, and hence a regular ranking function on a complete algebra
AΩ over Ω, where Ω ⊆ W × R is the set of all possible universes u = (wu, ru).
Let c : Ω → ℘ (W) × {R} be an alethically (and hence deontically) respectable
context. Let n be a number from N ∪ {∞}. For factual proposition A ⊆ W, let
rc (A) = n be the proposition that the counterfactual distance in context c to the
closest A-worlds equals n. Finally, let Ec ∈ AΩ be an arbitrary proposition that
is admissible in c. Then
Ra (A × R | rc (A) = n ∩ Ec) = n.
7Strictly speaking Stalnaker (1998) is representing contexts by a Kripke semantics with an
accessibility relation between worlds that is serial as well as transitive and Euclidian, but not
necessarily reflexive. These requirements translate into deontic (serial), doxastic (transitive plus
Euclidian), and alethic (reflexive) respectability.
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The Royal Rule for ranks says that an ideal doxastic agent’s initial strength of
disbelief in a factual proposition A, given that the counterfactual distance to the
closest A-worlds in context c equals n, and no further information that is not
admissible in c, should equal n. It is the rank-theoretic counterpart of the Principal
Principle. The latter principle says that, in the absence of further information
(or, if only admissible information is present), objective chances should guide an
ideal doxastic agent’s subjective credences. More generally, the idea is that, in
the absence of further information (or, if only admissible information is present),
the objective alethic modalities should guide an ideal doxastic agent’s subjective
doxastic modalities.
This idea underlies both the Principle Principle as well as the Royal Rule. In
the former case we focus on the alethic modality of objective chances, and on
the doxastic modality of subjective credences. In the latter case we focus on the
alethic modality of counterfactuality, and on the doxastic modality of conditional
belief. In these terms the Royal Rule says that, in the absence of further infor-
mation (or, if only admissible information is present), objective counterfactuals
should guide the ideal doxastic agent’s subjective conditional beliefs – and, more
generally, in the absence of further information (or, if only admissible informa-
tion is present), objective counterfactual distances should guide the ideal doxastic
agent’s subjective conditional grades of disbelief.
For purposes of illustration suppose you are certain of, or conditionalize on,
the counterfactual that the plate would break if it were dropped, and that this is all
you are certain of, or conditionalize on. The Royal Rule requires you to hold the
conditional belief that the plate will break given that it is dropped. More generally,
suppose an ideal doxastic is certain of, or conditionalizes on, the counterfactual
that C would be the case if A were the case, and suspends judgment with respect
to the antecedent A. Furthermore, suppose this is all the ideal doxastic agent
is certain of, or conditionalizes on. Given these assumptions, the Royal Rule
requires the ideal doxastic agent to hold the conditional belief in C given A.
If you have been trained in terms of Kripke-style accessibility relations, think
of the counterfactual distances as stairways that take you from the factual world
you are located at to other factual worlds. The counterfactual distance of a world
can be thought of as the number of steps on the stairway to this world. The coun-
terfactual distance of a proposition can be thought of as the number of steps on
the shortest stairway into this proposition. If you rather prefer Lewis style sim-
ilarity orderings, make the limit assumption so you can start counting, allow for
multiple copies of spheres with the copies being pictured as larger circles without
any additional dots (worlds) in them, and think of the counterfactual distance of
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a world as the number of the first sphere in this ordering that contains the world.
The counterfactual distance of a proposition can be thought of as the number of
the first sphere in this ordering which properly overlaps with the proposition.
Suppose an ideal doxastic agent is certain that Bizet was French and that Verdi
was Italian. For such an ideal doxastic agent the Royal Rule does not apply to
the counterfactual that Bizet would have been Italian if Bizet and Verdi had been
compatriots. The proposition that Bizet was French and Verdi was Italian contains
too much information and so overrules the counterfactual: it is not admissible.
Just as chances should guide one’s credences only if one is not certain about too
much else besides, counterfactual distances should guide an ideal doxastic agent’s
conditional beliefs only if she does not conditionalize on too much else besides.
If the ideal doxastic agent is certain of, or conditionalizes on, the proposition that
the coin lands heads, we can tell her whatever we want about how likely it is
that the coin lands tails: it will not, and it should not, affect her credence in the
proposition that the coin lands heads. If the ideal doxastic agent is certain of, or
conditionalizes on, the fact that Bizet was French, no counterfactual will change
her belief that he was. It is only when she has little or no factual information that
she should let the objective modalities guide her doxastic modalities.
The clinically clean case in which an ideal doxastic agent should obey the
Royal Rule is when she suspends judgment about all factual matters before she
conditionalizes on any counterfactual. This clinically clean case is, of course,
very different from our actual doxastic situations, and so it is difficult for us to
evaluate the intuitive plausibility of the Royal Rule in this case. Most of us cannot
foresee the future, though, and so forward looking counterfactuals may be a help-
ful approximation. If I am certain that my friends would bring along their children
if the weather was nice tomorrow, and that is all I believe as far as their possible
visit is concerned, then I should hold the conditional belief that my friends will
bring along their children given that the weather is nice tomorrow. As will be-
come clear below, for the purposes of this paper it is sufficient that the Royal Rule
holds, and that counterfactual distances guide an ideal doxastic agent’s conditional
grades of disbelief, in this one single clinically clean case where she is suspends
judgment with respect to all factual propositions before she conditionalizes on any
counterfactual.8
8In this connection I may perhaps repeat that I do not intend the Royal Rule to be accepted on
intuitive grounds and because it seems plausible, even in this one clinically clean case. As stressed
in the introduction, like every normative principle the Royal Rule has to be justified by proving it
to be the means to some end. Such a means-end relationship between the Royal Rule and some
pertinent epistemological goal still has to be established.
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Chances develop over time, and Lewis takes the complete history of world w
up to a certain point of time t, Hwt, to be admissible at t. Counterfactual distances
vary across contexts instead, and so it is tempting to assume accordingly that the
(intersection of all) presupposition(s) of universe u in context c, c (u), is admis-
sible in c. However, when giving in to the temptation it is important to note that
c (u) is the logically strongest proposition that is necessarily true at u in c. In this
sense c (u) is already contained in, or implied by, any counterfactual that is true at
u in c. c (u) merely delimits the set of factual worlds on which counterfactual dis-
tances are defined. The assumption that c (u) is admissible in c is not needed for
the argument that counterfactual distances have the structure of ranking functions;
it merely defines their domain.
The second assumption Lewis makes is that the theory of indeterministic alethic
modality of world w, w’s theory of chance, Tw, is admissible at any time. For
Lewis Tw is the conjunction of all true history-to-chance conditionals of the form:
Ht → cht (A) = x, where Ht completely, but not necessarily truly, specifies the
history of w up to t and, for true Ht, Ht → cht (A) = x is true at w just in case
cht (A) = x is (otherwise→ is stronger than the material conditional ⊃).
On this view historical information9 has to be admissible in order for informa-
tion about chances to be admissible, and hence in order for the Principal Principle
to entail that chances are probabilities. As explained in section 2, on my account
it does not make sense to speak of a factual world’s theory of indeterministic or
deterministic alethic modality. It makes only sense to speak of a universe’s the-
ory of indeterministic or deterministic alethic modality. The theory of chance of
universe u = (wu, chu, ru) is simply chu, and the theory of counterfactual distance
of u is simply ru. We can also formulate these theories as the following purely
modal propositions Tu and Du:10
Tu = {(w, ch, r) ∈W × CH × R : w ∈W, ch = chu, r ∈ R} = W × {chu} × R
Du = {(w, ch, r) ∈W × CH × R : w ∈W, ch ∈ CH, r = ru} = W × CH × {ru}
However, it is important to note that Tu is not a factual proposition over W, and
so is not in the domain of chu, as Hall (1994) has it (cf. Hoefer 1997). Con-
sequently chances cannot be iterated and we avoid the problem of undermining
9As an aside, note that history up to an arbitrary time t, whether complete or not, is an alethi-
cally respectable context.
10As another side, note that Lewis’ assumptions about admissibility, when translated into my
account, entail but are not entailed by the assumption that Tu is admissible.
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futures. Equally important, Du is not a factual proposition over W and so is not in
the domain of ru.
The presupposition of universe u in context c, c (u), and u’s theory of counter-
factual distance, Du, combine to the conjunction
c (u) ∩Du = {(w, r) ∈ Ω : ∃r′ ∈ R : (w, r′) ∈ c (u) , r = ru} = f (c (u)) × {ru} ,
where f (B) = {w ∈W : ∃r ∈ R : (w, r) ∈ B} is the factual component of B ⊆ Ω.
In alethically respectable contexts this conjunction is never empty, because
(wu, ru) ∈ c (u) ∩ Du. Since Ra is regular – which, in contrast to the proba-
bilistic case, is always possible – this implies that Ra (c (u) ∩Du) < ∞. Hence
Ra (A | c (u) ∩Du) is always well-defined, even if conditional ranking functions
are defined in a way different from section 3 (Huber 2006: 464).
We have finally reached the heart of this paper and can adopt an argument
from Lewis (1980: 276ff), who uses the Principal Principle to show that objective
chances are probabilities.
Assume the presupposition of universe u in context c, c (u), as well as u’s
theory of deterministic alethic modality or counterfactual distance, Du, to be ad-
missible in c. The Royal Rule yields, for every factual proposition A fromAW,
Ra (A × R | rc (A) = n ∩ c (u) ∩Du) = n,
where rc (A) = n is the purely modal proposition that the counterfactual distance
in context c to the closest A-worlds equals n:
rc (A) = n = {(w, r) : w ∈W, r (A) = n}
= W × {r ∈ R : r (A) = n}
c (u) and Du entail, for every factual proposition A, that rc (A) is what it is in
universe u in context c. Hence we can “reformulate” the Royal Rule as follows,
where ruc (A) is the counterfactual distance of the factual propositionA in universe
u in context c:
Royal Rule 2 Let Ra : AΩ → N ∪ {∞} be an ideal doxastic agent’s initial grad-
ing of disbelief, and hence a regular ranking function on a complete algebraAΩ
over Ω, where Ω ⊆ W × R is the set of all possible universes u = (wu, ru). Let
c : Ω→ ℘ (W)×{R} be an alethically (and hence deontically) respectable context.
Then we have for every factual proposition A fromAW
ruc (A) = Ra (A × R | c (u) ∩Du) .
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In words: the counterfactual distance distribution of universe u in context c, ruc,
comes from an ideal doxastic agent’s initial grading of disbelief Ra by condition-
alization on the presupposition of u in c, c (u), and u’s theory of deterministic
alethic modality, Du.
As we have seen in section 3 an ideal doxastic agent’s grading of disbelief Ra
should be a ranking function. Since, as we have also seen in section 3, everything
that comes from a ranking function by conditionalization is itself a ranking func-
tion, it follows that the counterfactual distance distribution of a universe in a given
context has the structure of a ranking function.
Note that one single case in which the Royal Rule holds suffices for this argu-
ment to work. The clinically clean case in which the ideal doxastic agent suspends
judgment with respect to all factual matters before conditionalizing on any coun-
terfactual, and in which she obeys the Royal Rule and lets counterfactual distances
guide her conditional grades of disbelief, suffices for a principled account of the
semantics of counterfactuals.
5 Consequences
For factual propositions A,C ⊆ W the proposition A  C is true in universe u
in context c – alternatively: at world wu relative to ranking function ru in context c
– just in case every ruc-minimal A-world is a C-world. As shown in the appendix,
the logic that results from this semantics is the basic conditional logic V. V is the
familiar Stalnaker-Lewis logic of counterfactuals, but without their controversial
centering axioms discussed below, and without Stalnaker’s controversial law of
conditional excluded middle discussed in the introduction. In this concluding
section I want to briefly discuss some consequences thereof.
Fix context c and let Aruc be the set of ruc-minimal A-worlds,
Aruc = {w ∈ A : ∀B ∈ AW : if w ∈ B, then ruc (B) ≤ ruc (A)}
= {w ∈ A : ruc ({w}) ≤ ruc (A)} ,
where the last equation presupposes that {w} ∈ AW for all w ∈ W, which is the
case if AW is the powerset of W, ℘ (W). Then, in context c, A  C is the
following proposition: {u ∈ Ω : Aruc ⊆ C}.
Therefore, for factual A and C, A C is a proposition inAU (not in AW),
but it does not make sense to iterate the counterfactual conditional operator .
(Counterfactual conditionals can be embedded by Boolean connectives, though.)
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The reason is that, without Humean supervenience of the counterfactual distances
r on the factual worlds w, this would require there to be second-order ranking
functions r2 defined on some algebra AY over the set of all possible pairs (w, r)
of factual worlds w and first-order ranking functions r, Y ⊆ W × R (the first-
order ranking functions are defined on some algebraAW over the set of all factual
worlds W). For two iterations of the counterfactual conditional operator we would
need third-order ranking functions r3 defined over some algebra AZ over the set
of all possible triples (w, r, r2) of factual worlds w, first-order ranking functions r,
and second-order ranking functions r2, Z ⊆ Y × R2.
Consequently the non-iterability of some conditional operator→ does not im-
ply that A → C is no proposition. This blocks the following fairly prominent
argument in the literature on (mainly indicative, but in the case of Edgington also
counterfactual) conditionals (Bennett 2003: ch. 7 and ch. 16, Edgington 1995;
2008, Gibbard 1981). With reference to natural language it is argued that it is
hard if not impossible to iterate (indicative) conditionals. This is then taken as ev-
idence for the thesis that (indicative) conditionals have no truth value. The present
account shows that this inference is not valid. The purported non-iterability of the
counterfactual conditional can also be explained by the failure of Humean super-
venience of counterfactual distances on factual worlds.11
Let us briefly turn to contexts. For factual A ⊆ W define A to be true in
universe u in context c – alternatively: at world wu relative to ranking function ru
in context c – just in case ¬A A is true in u in c.
Suppose A is a presupposition of u in c in the sense that c (u) ⊆ A × R. Then,
since A × R is non-empty (this is so because c (u) is non-empty),
ruc (A) = Ra (A × R | c (u) ∩Du) = Ra (c (u) ∩Du) − Ra (c (u) ∩Du) = 0.
Conversely, if ¬A is a presupposition of u in c so that c (u) ∩ (A × R) = ∅, then
ruc (A) = Ra (A × R | c (u) ∩Du) = Ra (∅) − R (c (u) ∩Du) = ∞,
because c (u)∩Du is non-empty and Ra is regular. Recall that c (u) is of the form






11To be sure, if we have Humean supervenience of deterministic alethic modalities on non-
modal facts, a modal proposition such as A  C amounts to a factual proposition, and then
 can be iterated indefinitely. In this case the above inference from non-iterability to non-
propositionality is valid.
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Since Ra is regular, f (c (u)) is the weakest proposition with this property. That




= n < ∞. This means that f (c (u)) is the set of
all factual worlds that are accessible from u in c so that A is true in u in c if
only if f (c (u)) ⊆ A. In other words, all and only the presuppositions of u in c are
necessarily true in u in c.
Furthermore, wu ∈ f (c (u)) in alethically respectable contexts c, which means
that, in alethically respectable contexts, what is necessarily true is true, A ⊃ A.
This, however, is not a consequence of the Royal Rule, but built into the definition
of alethically respectable contexts, in which the Royal Rule is supposed to hold.
Other assumptions about the contexts in which the Royal Rule is supposed to
hold give rise to other modal logics. However, the logic of counterfactuals always
remains the same basic conditional logic V (contrast this with Williamson 2007:
ch. 5 and app. 1).
Another consequence is the limit assumption (Lewis 1973: 19ff), which is
necessary and sufficient for counterfactual consistency (Herzberger 1979): for any
universe u and context c there is at least one world w in W such that ruc ({w}) = 0.
Call such a world a center of u in c. While there always is a center in any non-
empty context, nothing guarantees that the actual world wu is a center of u, let
alone its only center. The latter two conditions are the contents of the principles
of weak centering and strong centering, to which we turn now.
Strong centering has long been attacked, because it validates the following
principle: (A ∩ C) ⊃ (A C). Weak centering validates: (A C) ⊃ (A ⊃ C),
which is Modus Ponens for the counterfactual conditional operator and seems
more reasonable. But arguing on the basis of seeming reasonableness is exactly
the kind of intuition-based philosophy I try not to engage in. While we may not
be able to do completely without intuitions, we can try to minimize reliance on
intuitions.
Nozick (1981) and Iatridou (2000) and Gunderson (2004) and Menzies (2004)
and Leitgeb (2012a, 2012b) are examples of an increasing number of philosophers
who reject weak centering (as well as strong centering). The Royal Rule does not
imply that ruc ({wu}) = 0, and so I do not subscribe to weak centering either.
In fact, weak centering would trivialize the Royal Rule. For suppose we had
ruc ({wu}) = 0 for all u and c. The Royal Rule implies Ra (A × R | rc (A) = n) = n.
But if ruc (A) = n > 0 and weak centering holds, then wu < A, which means
that A is false in wu in c relative to ru. Hence n = Ra (A × R | rc (A) = n) =
Ra
(
A × R | rc (A) = n ∩ A × R
)
= ∞, which means the Royal Rule would hold
only if n = ∞ or n = 0.
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Strong centering is true, and weak centering is analytically true, on an in-
terpretation of counterfactuals in terms of similarity. I reject this interpretation
together with those principles (see also Hájek ms). Weak and strong centering are
not plausible on an interpretation of counterfactuals in terms of atypicality or ab-
normality. As mentioned in the introduction, counterfactual distance figures as a
primitive on my account. In particular, I do not want to suggest that counterfactual
distance should be interpreted in terms atypicality or abnormality. The counter-
factual A C implies, but is not implied by the claim that: if A, then normally
or typically C. However, as I show in (Huber ms) atypicality or abnormality12,
in a precise sense, provides empirical evidence for counterfactual distance, and
under certain assumptions allows us to reliably infer the truth values of various
counterfactuals. Therefore it may be helpful to think of counterfactuals in terms
of typicality when considering why weak and strong centering fail.
Despite my reservations about the reliability of intuitions, it is interesting to
speculate about the reason for the intuitive pull of weak and strong centering as
well as conditional excluded middle that some philosophers seem to feel. I will
conclude by briefly indulging therein. A particularly important subclass of the
class of all counterfactuals are those non-backtracking counterfactuals that enter
into the analysis of causation. On a structural equations account of causation in
terms of so-called causal models those causal counterfactuals satisfy weak and
strong centering. If the causal model is acyclic, as is usually assumed, these
counterfactuals additionally satisfy conditional excluded middle. The present
rank-theoretic semantics for counterfactuals is a semantics for all counterfactu-
als, backtracking and other non-causal counterfactuals and causal counterfactuals
alike. Weak and strong centering and conditional excluded middle do not hold for
the class of all counterfactuals. However, these principles do hold for the class of
all causal counterfactuals, as shown in Huber (2013). Maybe this can explain the
intuitive pull of these principles that some philosophers feel.
Another possible explanation is suggested by Leitgeb (2012a, 2012b). He
presents a different, probabilistic semantics for the same basic conditional logic
V and points out that the following substitutes for weak and strong centering are
logically valid.
Lt 1 (A C) ⊃ (W (A ⊃ C))
Lt 2 (W A ∩ C) ⊃ (A C)
12Strictly speaking it is not typicality or normality, but rather what statisticians call the mode(s)
of a sample that provide(s) evidence for counterfactuals. Since talk of the mode of a sample mis-
leadingly suggests a connection to modalities, I have formulated the above in terms of typicality.
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Whatever the best explanation for the intuitive pull of these principles, fortunately
we do not have to rely on it.
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6 Appendix: Logical Considerations
Let us first consider system C2 from Stalnaker (1968). Let L0 be the smallest set
that contains a given countable set of propositional variables PV and is closed un-
der the classical connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, and ⊃. LetL1 be the smallest set containing
L0 and α β for any two α, β from L0. Let L be the smallest set that contains
L1 and is closed under the classical connectives. Finally, let L+ be the smallest
set containing PV (or any of the above mentioned languages) that is closed under
the classical connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, ⊃ plus.
So the language L is built up form a countable set of propositional variables
in the usual way, with the only exception that α γ is a well-formed formula if
and only if α and γ are well-formed formulae and do not contain an occurrence
of . A,B,C, . . . are the sets of models in which α, β, γ, . . . are true. Ranking
functions are defined on some finitary / σ- / complete field over the set of models
of L, ModL.
The rules of inference of C2 are Modus Ponens and Necessitation, both of
which preserve validity.
RI 1 ` α, ` α ⊃ β ⇒ ` β
RI 2 ` α ⇒ ` α
The axiom schemata of C2 are St 1 to St 7, all of which are valid except for
Conditional Excluded Middle St 5 and Weak Centering St 6.
St 1 All tautologies are axioms.
St 2 
(
α ⊃ γ) ⊃ (α ⊃ γ)
St 3 
(
α ⊃ γ) ⊃ (α γ)
St 1 is trivially validated, because classical logic is presupposed. As to St 2 and St
3, suppose
(
α ⊃ γ) is true atwu in c relative to ru. This means that¬ (α ⊃ γ)(
α ⊃ γ) is true at wu in c relative to ru, i.e. (A ∩ C)ruc ⊆ A∪C. Since (A ∩ C)ruc ⊆
A ∩ C, this can only happen if A ∪ C = ModL, i.e. A ⊆ C. For St 2 suppose that
α is true at wu in c relative to ru. This means A
ruc ⊆ A and since Aruc ⊆ A, this
can only happen if A = ModL. Consequently C = ModL and hence C
ruc ⊆ C = ∅
and hence C
ruc ⊆ C, which means that γ is true at wu in c relative to ru. For St 3
we have Aruc ⊆ A ⊆ C, which means that α γ is true at wu in c relative to ru.
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St 4 α ⊃ ((α β) ⊃ ¬ (α ¬β))
Suppose α and α  β are true at wu in c relative to ru, i.e. Aruc * A and
Aruc ⊆ B. It follows that ∅ , Aruc ∩ A ⊆ Aruc ⊆ B, and hence that Aruc * B, i.e.
that ¬ (α ¬β) is true at wu in c relative to ru.




β ∨ γ)) ⊃ (α β) ∨ (α γ)
Conditional Excluded Middle St 5 is not valid. Consider the language L over





c (u) = ModL × {R} for all u ∈ ModL × R, and let u∗ = (wu∗ , ru∗) with wu∗ = wpq
and ru∗c ({w}) = 0 for all w ∈ ModL. p  q ∨ ¬q is true at wu∗ in c relative
to ru∗ , but both p  q and p  ¬q are false at wu∗ in c relative to ru∗ . This
is so because Pru∗c = P and Qru∗c = Q and P
ru∗c
= P and Q
ru∗c
= Q, and hence
Pru∗c ⊆ Q ∪Q = ModL while Pru∗c * Q and Pru∗c * Q.
St 6 (Weak Centering)
(
α β
) ⊃ (α ⊃ β)
Weak Centering St 6 is not valid. Let L, ModL, and c be as before, and let




= 1 and ru∗c ({w}) = 0 for all
w ∈ ModL with w , wp¬q. p  q is true at wu∗ = wp¬q in c relative to ru∗ , but




















) ∧ (β α) is true at wu in c relative to ru, i.e. Aruc ⊆ B and
Bruc ⊆ A. This implies Aruc = (A ∩ B)ruc and Bruc = (A ∩ B)ruc , and so Aruc = Bruc .
It follows that Bruc ⊆ C if Cruc ⊆ C, i.e that (α γ) ⊃ (β γ) is true at wu in
c relative to ru.
Strong Centering St 8 is a consequence of St 1-7 and RI 1-2.
St 8 (Strong Centering)
(
α ∧ γ) ⊃ (α γ)
Strong Centering St 8 is not valid. Let L, ModL, c, and u∗ be as in the counter-
model to Conditional Excluded Middle St 5. p∧q is true at wu∗ = wpq in c relative
to ru∗ , but p q is not, because Pru∗c = P * Q.
In Lewis’ (1973) terminology C2 is the system VCS. VCS results from the
basic conditional logic V by adding St 5, St 6, and St 8. Lewis’ “offical logic of
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counterfactuals” (Lewis 1973: 132) is the system VC, which results from V by
adding Weak Centering St 6 and Strong Centering St 8. The system VW results
from V by adding Weak Centering St 6.
The system V consists of the rules of inference R 1-3 and the axiom schemata
L 1-5, where ≡ is the material biconditional, α is defined as ¬α α, and α
is defined as ¬¬α.
R 1 ` α, ` α ⊃ β ⇒ ` β
R 2 ` β1 ∧ . . . ∧ βn ⊃ γ ⇒ (α β1) ∧ . . . ∧ (α βn) ⊃ (α γ)





results from γ by substituting α for some occurrence of β in γ.
L 1 Truth-functional tautologies.
L 2 α α
L 3 γ ⊃ (α γ)
L 4 ¬ (α ¬β) ⊃ ((α ∧ β γ) ≡ (α (β ⊃ γ)))
V is sound and complete with respect to the rank-theoretic semantics of counter-
factuals. To state and prove this result some technical terminology has to be intro-
duced, though I will ignore contexts in order to avoid unnecessary complications.(
W,AW,R,Ω, ϕ) is a rank-theoretic model for L just in case W is a non-empty
set of factual worlds, AW is an algebra over W such that ϕ (α) ∈ AW × {R} for
every α from L0, R is a set of ranking functions r : AW →N∪ {∞}, Ω ⊆W ×R
is such that for each w ∈ W there is at least one r ∈ R such that (w, r) ∈ Ω, and




) ∈ (℘ (W) × {R}) ∩Ω if p ∈ PV
2. ϕ (¬α) = Ω \ ϕ (α)
3. ϕ
(














w ∈W : ∃r : (w, r) ∈ ϕ (α)}.
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(
W,AW,R,Ω, ϕ) is a Humean rank-theoretic model forL+ just in case W is a
non-empty set of factual worlds,AW is an algebra over W such that ϕ (α) ∈ AW
for every α fromL+, R is a set of ranking functions r : AW → N∪{∞}, Ω ⊆W×R
is such that for each w ∈W there is exactly one r = rw ∈ R such that (w, rw) ∈ Ω,




) ∈ ℘ (W) if p ∈ PV
2. ϕ (¬α) = W \ ϕ (α)
3. ϕ
(







w ∈W : ϕ (α)rw ⊆ ϕ (β)}
Every Humean rank-theoretic model M+ = (W+,AW+ ,R+,Ω+, ϕ+) for L+ can
be reduced to a rank-theoretic modelM = (W,AW,R,Ω, ϕ) forL as follows. Let
W = W+ andAW = AW+ ∩ {ϕ+ (α) : α ∈ L0}. Take any r+w ∈ R+ and restrict it to
AW, i.e. rw (A) = r+w (A) ifA ∈ AW and undefined otherwise. This gives usR. Let
Ω be the set of all pairs (w, rw) with rw resulting from r+w as indicated. Since for
each w ∈ W+ = W there is exactly one r+w ∈ R+ it immediately follows that there
is at least one rw ∈ R for each w ∈ W. Finally, let ϕ (α) = ϕ+ (α) × R for α ∈ L
to obtain ϕ : L → ℘ (Ω). It is routine to check that α ∈ L is true in the Humean
rank-theoretic model M+ just in case α is true in the rank-theoretic model M.
Consequently each set L of sentences from L that has a Humean rank-theoretic
model also has a rank-theoretic model.
Soundness is easily checked – especially since we are ignoring contexts. R 1
is RI 1. R 3 is trivial, because classical logic is presupposed. As to R 2, suppose
` β1∧. . . βn ⊃ γ, i.e. B1∩. . .∩B2 ⊆ C. If (α β1)∧. . .∧(α βn) is true at wu
relative to ru, then Aru ⊆ B1, and . . ., and Aru ⊆ Bn and so Aru ⊆ B1∩ . . .∩Bn ⊆ C,
which means that α γ is true at wu relative to ru, for any universe u = (wu, ru).
L1 is St1. L2 follows from St1, RI2, and St3. L3 follows from St3. As
to L4, suppose ¬ (α¬ β) is true at wu relative to ru. This means that Aru *
B. Suppose first that α ∧ β  γ is true at wu relative to ru. This means that
(A ∩ B)ru ⊆ C. If wu ∈ Aru ∩ B, then wu ∈ B ∪ C. If wu ∈ Aru ∩ B, then
wu ∈ (A ∩ B)ru ⊆ C. Therefore Aru ⊆ B ∪ C, which means that α (B ⊃ γ) is
true at wu relative to ru. Now suppose α
(
β ⊃ γ) is true at wu relative to ru.
This means that Aru ⊆ B ∪ C. If w ∈ (A ∩ B)ru ∩ Aru , then wu ∈ Aru ∩ B, and so
wu ∈ C. If wu ∈ (A ∩ B)ru ∩ Aru , then ru (A) < ru (A ∩ B) and so Aru ∩ B = ∅,
contradicting Aru * B. Therefore (A ∩ B)ru ⊆ C, which means that α∧ β γ is
true at wu relative to ru.
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This shows that the system V on the language L is sound with respect to the
rank-theoretic semantics of counterfactuals and, consequently, that the system V
on the languageL+ is sound with respect to the Humean rank-theoretic semantics
of counterfactuals.
Let us now establish completeness.13 It follows from Lewis (1973: ch. 6) that
eachV-consistent set L+ of sentences fromL+ has a modelM∗ = (W, ($w)w∈W , ϕ),
where for each w ∈W, $w ⊆ ℘ (W) is a set of spheres (around w), i.e. $w is nested
and closed under arbitrary unions and intersections. Since V has the finite model
property with respect to Lewis’ semantics, we can assume W to be finite. For each
w ∈W, $w is of the form S0 ∪ S1 ∪ . . .∪ Swn , where any two Si and S j are disjoint
and
⋃
0≤i≤ j Si is the j-th sphere (around w). For w′ ∈ W, define rw ({w′}) = i if
w′ ∈ Si, and let rw (A) = min {rw ({w′}) : w′ ∈ A}. Each rw defined in this way
is a regular ranking function on ℘ (W). Let AW = ℘ (W), R = {rw : w ∈W},
and Ω = {(w, rw) : w ∈W}. M+ = (W,AW,R,Ω, ϕ) is a Humean rank-theoretic
model. For α ∈ L+ let jα be the smallest number (if any) such that ϕ (α) ∩ S jα is
non-empty. By definition ϕ (α)rw = S jα ∩ ϕ (α). Therefore α ∈ L+ is true in w in
M∗ in Lewis’ sense just in case α is true in w inM+ in our sense.
Now suppose L is a V-consistent set of sentences from L. Close L under the
classical connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, ⊃ plus to obtain a set of sentences L+ from L+.
By the above, L+ has a Humean rank-theoretic modelM+. ReduceM+ to obtain
a rank-theoretic modelM for L as shown above. This completes the proof for
Theorem 2 V restricted to L is sound and complete with respect to the rank-
theoretic semantics of counterfactuals. V on the full language L+ is sound and
complete with respect to the Humean rank-theoretic semantics of counterfactuals.
Call a (Humean) ranktheoretic model
(
W,AW,R,Ω, ϕ) weakly/strongly centered
just in case each ru ∈ R is such that ru ({w}) = 0 if/iff w = wu. Then it holds that
Theorem 3 VW restricted to L is sound and complete with respect to the weakly
centered rank-theoretic semantics of counterfactuals. VW on the full languageL+
is sound and complete with respect to the weakly centered Humean rank-theoretic
semantics of counterfactuals.
Theorem 4 VC restricted toL is sound and complete with respect to the strongly
centered rank-theoretic semantics of counterfactuals. VC on the full language
L+ is sound and complete with respect to the strongly centered Humean rank-
theoretic semantics of counterfactuals.
13The idea to derive completeness from Lewis’ completeness results and the finite model prop-
erty is due to Leitgeb (2012a, 2012b).
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